

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 26 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

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Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. J. de CASTRO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GHELEV  
Mr. D. TEKHOV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON  
U SAIN BWA  
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. Paul MARTIN  
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. M. BOW

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. J. BUCEK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ  
Mr. E. STANLEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LINDE  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. M. STAHL

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IERAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TANCOURDIN  
Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. S. MacDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and seventy-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker I should like, on behalf of the Committee, to welcome the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Paul Martin, who is today leading the Canadian delegation. Owing to the high post he holds in his Government, and to his personal prestige and experience as a statesman, Mr. Martin confers a very special interest on our meeting by his presence here today. It is a further proof of the importance attached by the Canadian Government to the problem of disarmament, and of its untiring interest in searching for a solution to this problem.

As Chairman of this meeting I consider it my duty to thank you for your presence, while assuring you, as representative of Italy, that my delegation and, I think, the entire Committee have always greatly appreciated the contribution which your representative in our Committee, Mr. Burns, has consistently made by reason of his great competence and wide experience of our work.

I should also like to welcome very cordially Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State of the United Kingdom, who has been working with us for a long time, and to tell him that we are very happy to have him back with us again.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): First of all I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your very kind words of welcome and to say how glad I am to be back in this Committee, if only this time for a fleeting visit. Since I was last here there have been several changes around this table; and I should like, if I may, to extend my personal greetings to those more recent arrivals whom I have not yet had the opportunity to hear in person. I have of course followed with great interest, through the records, the contributions that have already been made to the work of the Committee by our new United States co-Chairman, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Lind of Sweden, Mr. Hassan of the United Arab Republic, and Mr. Lobodycz of Poland. I think the past two months of the Committee's labours have helped to advance its work, and in this the contributions of those I have mentioned, as of course of those who were here before, have all played a valuable part.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Perhaps I might be permitted also to echo the welcome that you, Mr. Chairman, gave to Mr. Paul Martin. I am sure the Committee is delighted to see him here today, as indeed we are pleased to see Mr. de Araújo Castro. The presence of these two statesmen indicates, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the great value that their respective countries place on the work of this Committee. I have read the stimulating address which Mr. de Araujo Castro made on 24 March (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 5 et seq.), and I am sure the whole Committee looks forward to hearing Mr. Martin speak today.

Since my last attendance here, a brief but fruitful visit has been made by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler. When I say "fruitful" I have in mind particularly his own reaction to his time here, which I know he found heartening and instructive. He very much appreciated the opportunity it gave him to meet the representatives who make up this Committee and to draw on their accumulated fund of wisdom. From that point of view his visit fully lived up to his hopes.

From the point of view of what he brought with him, the judgement must lie primarily with the other members of the Committee. I hope and believe that to the great majority the ideas he expounded appeared constructive and useful. It was only disappointing that Mr. Gromyko, when choosing to lecture the Committee from the fastness of the Krenlin (ENDC/127\*), should have thought it necessary to misinterpret Mr. Butler's words (ENDC/PV.169, p.9) on some of the issues he had mentioned, in order to turn them into something he could reject. Sir Paul Mason has already spoken here, on 5 March (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 19 et seq.), to set the record straight and show those distortions for what they were. I need not go over the same ground again.

The point is clear enough that, far from trying to bury Mr. Gromyko's idea of a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) under the retorts of a laboratory, Mr. Butler was asking the Soviet representative to take that proposal further out of its wrapping so that we could all see what its proportions were. It is equally clear that when he was speaking of going into the laboratory -- in quite another context, incidentally -- his meaning was quite simple and, indeed, quite obvious: that in matters so complex as those before us it is not enough to agree on phrases or ambiguous forms of words. The world wants a solid machine, not a paper model; and for that we need blue-prints, not an artist's sketch. I am sorry to talk in metaphors, but, if I may continue the metaphor, we must work out what is weight-bearing and what is not, in an apparatus which has no precedents. We shall not find the answers by oratory alone; we must go into the laboratory and establish our data.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

As the Committee knows, we share with several other delegations the view that this need applies among other instances, to the significance in matters of disarmament -- to the weight-bearing qualities, one might say -- of published figures of military expenditure. At present the gross defence expenditure of the United Kingdom, according to the figures we publish, is going up, while the gross defence expenditure of the Soviet Union, according to the figures it publishes, is going down. Does that mean that the Soviet Union is halting the arms race and that we are urging it on? If that question is not to be purely rhetorical, one cannot answer it without examining what is put into published figures for military expenditure and what is left out; without comparing this year's cuts or increases with last year's -- or the last several years' -- figures; without weighing changes in pay scales, unit costs and the like; without, in fact, making sure that what you are comparing is comparable.

Nor is it, of course, very realistic -- as others in this Committee have pointed out -- to examine the levels of defence expenditure without giving any consideration to what the country concerned feels obliged to defend itself against. Old threats may go, but new threats may arise. That is regrettable, but it is a fact which must be faced if we are engaged in something more than word-spinning. That is why, while understanding very well the attractions which many delegations see in trying to approach disarmament, at least in part, through the manipulation of military budgets, we consider that an essential prerequisite is an intensive but rapid course in the laboratory.

Incidentally, I do not know why Mr. Gromyko should have given the opinion, in his interview with Izvestia, that the examination of disarmament problems by experts should take eight years (ENDC/127\*, p.4). That is his figure, not ours, and he had no reason to ascribe it to Her Majesty's Government. The thesis that, because detailed studies in the League of Nations were not followed by decisions, we should now take decisions without study at all has always struck me as, logically, singularly weak. That someone else assembled all the bricks and then failed to build the house is no reason for saying that, for the house we want to build, bricks are unnecessary. We shall need them, and the sooner we start laying them the sooner we can put on the roof. It is not doing so that wastes time, but the endless reiteration of statements that they are unnecessary.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

I should like now to turn to two subjects on which Mr. Butler enlarged in his address to the Committee. It will be remembered that, among the six cardinal points upon which he suggested that we should try to make progress, the first was an agreement on establishing an observation-post system, and the sixth was the early physical destruction of some armaments (ENDC/FV.169, p.9).

On the latter, the Committee heard an impressive exposition of United States proposals last week (ENDC/FV.176, pp. 5 et seq.). As Sir Paul Mason then said, this is a matter which has always lain very close to the heart of the United Kingdom Government (ibid., p.28). Our final aim is the elimination of all major armaments from the national arsenals of States, and we must continue to strive for that to come about as rapidly as possible. But, on the most optimistic assumptions, it is bound to take time. Meanwhile, it has always seemed to us that there would be great value if we could show the world that we have set our feet upon the road, however long that road may be. To begin is often the hardest part of any journey; and even the smallest beginning is important, for it marks the end of hesitancy and demonstrates a determination to overcome fear.

The United States proposal, however, is not so small a beginning as all that. The B-47 and TU-16 bombers to which it refers remain in themselves most formidable weapons of war, even for the United States and the Soviet Union. They will, if not destroyed, remain so for some time; and, where many other States to which they might otherwise be handed on are concerned, they offer terrifying prospects for the continuance of those "private arms races" to which Mr. Butler referred on 25 February (ENDC/FV.169, p.15).

I know that the Soviet proposal on physical destruction (ENDC/123) goes much further than that. It does not appear, however, that the United States proposal can by any interpretation be regarded as inconsistent with the Soviet ideas. It might even be regarded as a first step in their direction, with the advantages that it is succinct, that it is immediately applicable, that it meets the requirements of balance, and that it involves only a degree of verification to which no one, even the most suspicious, could object.



(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

It is a thought which must haunt us all that, while discussions continue here, the very problems we are discussing are daily becoming harder of solution and the remedies of today can become inadequate for the problems of tomorrow. The proposal put to us by the United States delegation on the destruction of bombers, like its proposal for a freeze of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120), can be adopted now.

The representative of the Soviet Union says that such measures do not constitute disarmament. My reply is that only by such preliminary measures are we likely to halt the arms race. If this proposal is only adopted later, its value will be less. If we let this opportunity pass, it will only be harder to make a beginning later. If, on the other hand, this opportunity can be seized, it could well be the beginning of larger things. As Mr. Butler said on 25 February:

"Once the first step in destruction of weapons has been taken, we hope that other more substantial ones may follow. A second round of destruction might include other armaments, such as tanks and some at least of the more modern types of delivery vehicles -- missiles as well as bombers." (ENDC/FV.169, p.13)

These are, I know, radical ideas -- more radical than we can, perhaps, expect to find general endorsement for at this stage; more radical, I should say, than any idea of trying to negotiate an elimination from the defence systems of all countries, great or small, of all aircraft, new or old, that could carry a bomb. But they are also easier to contemplate, inasmuch as they could result, as Mr. Butler said, in --

"... a world in which security was maintained by a balance of power at a lower, safer and less costly level than that of today." (ibid.)

We have already before us, however, a proposal for a beginning along this road. I am sure that we should accept it.

I should now like to turn to that other cardinal point in Mr. Butler's list to which I referred earlier: an agreement on observation posts. This was, as the Committee will recall, the first point on the list, and it is one to which my Government attaches considerable significance.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

The basic idea is not, of course, a new one. It can be found in general terms both in President Johnson's message to this Committee of 21 January (ENDC/120) and in the Soviet memorandum of 28 January (ENDC/123). It has been a recurrent subject of debate since 1955. Novelty, however, is not a primary virtue in our work here, where we are looking in particular for ways of developing possible areas of agreement. It has long seemed to my Government not only that the proposal to establish such an observation-post system offers an opportunity for agreement on a collateral measure of intrinsic value and mutual interest, but also that the proposal is one on which such agreement should not be impossibly difficult to achieve. As Mr. Butler said (ENDC/PV.169, p.10), we believe that such a system would be of value because it could give each side a reassurance about the capabilities and designs of the others. It is a measure which could be put into effect without upsetting the delicate balance upon which security depends; and it would be an important step towards other measures of true disarmament.

The arguments why, in advance of general and complete disarmament, a system of observation posts could prove of real value in helping to avoid war are familiar to the Committee. In the last resort, such security as we now enjoy is based on mutual nuclear deterrence: that is, on both sides knowing that, if they were to start hostilities, they could not evade the possibility of the conflict's leading to a nuclear riposte. Because of the likelihood of escalation, even limited hostilities carry such a risk. No one will pretend that this is an ideal situation, but in the present armed world it helps to keep the peace between the nuclear Powers.

This situation can be improved -- by mutual consent -- in three ways. The first is by diminishing the risk that an accident might mistakenly be taken as heralding an all-out attack. The second is by diminishing the risk of war being started by miscalculation, because one side has made a wrong appreciation of the other side's interests involved or the other side's resolve and ability to defend them. Thirdly, the situation can be improved by diminishing the risk that one side will believe that it can secure initial or limited advantage by launching a surprise attack which the other might then be unwilling or unable to repulse.

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Now, the characteristic of the first of those risks is that an accident is likely to be isolated. It is most unlikely to happen all along the line. To avoid its leading to a chain reaction the most important thing is, therefore, that it should be recognized for what it is and very quickly. It seems clear enough that a system of observation posts could well be devised that would provide evidence that a **particular incident** was the result of an accident and was not associated with preparations for war.

In the same way, during periods of heightened tension the reports of observation posts could, as has frequently been pointed out, improve both sides' knowledge of the extent to which the other was or was not making overt military preparations. This would have a clear value in avoiding war by miscalculation.

As regards the risk of surprise attack, it seems to us that the existence of observation posts could well be of value in reducing the amount of secret reinforcement and preparation that could be undertaken without detection; and this would inevitably help by making an aggressive military move proportionately more hazardous for the aggressor.

It would, of course, be going altogether too far to suggest that even the most far-reaching system of observation posts could of itself prevent war if anyone were so mad as deliberately to embark upon it. The most that could be expected is that the observers' reports would provide that margin of warning which would enable the victim to alert its defences and permit diplomatic and political action -- such as the use of the "hot line" -- and to avert the outbreak of a war that neither side desired. Such an achievement, however, would make a very important contribution to the reassurance, the relaxation and the building-up of mutual confidence, with which progress towards general and complete disarmament is so intimately allied. The root of many of our problems is distrust. This is understandable when the risks are so many and so grave. If one could remove or even mitigate any of this distrust, it seems to us that it would be worth going a long way to do so.

That is, one might say, the prima facie case for believing that the establishment of a system of observation posts could be a useful collateral measure. But it is of course necessary to put flesh -- as I have said on a previous occasion, "solid healthy flesh" -- on these bones. We need agreement not only on a general principle but specifically on the precise purposes any system proposed should fulfil. Only on

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that basis could we judge all the interrelated factors which could affect our decision on the merits of one kind of observation system or another --- such questions as the following. Do we need a rapid knowledge of even very minor movements, or will something more modest suffice? What kinds of movements need to be observed, and how can this be done most economically and with the minimum intrusion? What is the size and shape the system should take if it is best to fulfil the purpose agreed? How should the posts be organized and manned and supervised? What facilities would they need, and how could abuse of those facilities be avoided? There are of course many more questions of the same kind.

All those are matters on which there could be quite a wide variety of views, but any decision actually to set up a system would require agreement and understanding on each of them. To achieve that will take time and thought and labour. We have had calls from all sides of the Committee to get down to business, and as a contribution towards this end my delegation has asked the Secretariat to circulate a United Kingdom paper which sets out in general terms the matters on which it seems to us agreement will be necessary for an efficient and effective, but not unnecessarily obtrusive, observation-post system to be established. As will be seen, in that paper we have advanced certain views. They are not necessarily final views, and we do not ask that there should be immediate agreement to them in principle. They are put forward as a basis for discussion, whether in this Committee in plenary session or in more informal discussions. We hope that this paper may help towards a crystallization of views and thereby towards the possibility of a substantive agreement, whether concluded here or elsewhere.

In this connexion it will be seen that for the most part our paper is drafted in general terms which could apply to the establishment of an observation-post system in any part of the world where the risks of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack might arise. We have borne in mind, however, the generally-accepted view that the outstanding need at the present time is to reduce the risks of war arising in these ways between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the members of NATO on the other. The areas of the world covered by the two sides are, of course, immense; and, as you will see from paragraph 13 of the paper,

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our view is that the system should be similarly wide. At the same time, however, we also recognize that the numbers of posts should be based on considerations of balance and mutual interest.

I hope that both those thoughts will be recognized as corresponding to realism. They imply, of course, negotiation elsewhere as well as here. If, as I hope, we find that we can make some progress here through this United Kingdom paper we are circulating, my Government -- and I am sure the Governments of other NATO members represented here -- will wish to maintain close contact on the subject with our other NATO allies. I am sure that, in the same way, the Soviet Government will wish to proceed in close contact with its allies.

That is really all I have to say. The world we live in has been described as a powder magazine, and so it is. The risks we run from an accidental spark are of appalling and almost inconceivable proportions. Our primary task here is to find and agree on ways of emptying the powder kegs. We must pursue the task with despatch, but it cannot be done with too much haste; it requires considerable care and patience. While we are engaged on this task it is not only wise but imperative that we overlook no opportunity of preventing the kegs from exploding by accident or mistake. The cost to traditional concepts that we should be prepared to accept if need be should bear some relation to the risks we now run if we cling to these concepts at the expense of greater security. To have a system of observation posts spread across the globe to mitigate the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack would have been regarded by our grandfathers as beyond the realm of fantasy. For us, I submit, it may well be no less than common prudence. I hope the Committee will agree that the time has come for us to give serious consideration to this proposal.

Mr. MARTIN (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I should first of all like to express to you my gratitude for the very generous words which you used in extending a welcome to me at this table this morning; and I am particularly grateful that you called my attention to the contribution which Mr. Burns and his colleagues representing Canada on this Committee have been able to make to your deliberations. I also thank Mr. Thomas -- as one who apparently attends these deliberations much more often than I, unfortunately, have a chance of doing -- for joining in extending a welcome to me.

(Mr. Martin, Canada)

I should like to say to my colleague the Foreign Minister of Brazil that I am very much honoured that he should be here this morning. I read his statement of Tuesday (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 5 et seq.) with great interest. I regard it as a positive contribution to our deliberations, and I must say that I am happy to see him here this morning, because Brazil and Canada have shared some common experiences, and notable among these is our collaboration in the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations in the United Nations Emergency Force.

There is a great temptation for me this morning -- and I am not going to escape it -- to be a little nostalgic. Mr. Butler said, either in open committee or to someone when he was here in January, that the last time he was in this room was in 1939. The last time I was in this room, until this morning, was in 1938. When one thinks of all that has happened since that date -- a great war, all the discussions that led to the establishment of the United Nations and all the discussions that we have had in the field of disarmament, which happily are at any rate continuing -- one can appreciate the importance and the significance of our work in this Committee.

My own associations with disarmament discussions go back to 1953, when, on behalf of three members of the five-Power Sub-Committee, I carried on some talks with Mr. Vyshinsky that led to a reactivation of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. While the agreement that we were able to effect was simply on a procedural point, the extent of the deterioration of East-West relations at that time perhaps is symbolized by the recognition that a mere agreement on a procedural point represented a major triumph. So, when we come to estimate and calculate the work of this Committee, we may possibly look upon what has happened, and what has been achieved since that time, and place it along-side the comparatively unimportant achievement of merely resuming discussions as was done following the talks between Mr. Vyshinsky and myself as the spokesman for three other members of the Sub-Committee at that time.

Two years ago the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held its first meeting in this historic room. Since then there have been periods of disappointment -- sometimes of great discouragement -- when progress has seemed painfully slow in the light of the urgency of the problems of peace and disarmament. But I should like to say to you that I think the Committee's achievements are not without some

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noteworthy aspects; and certainly the world has been watching its work and has reasons, in spite of the frustrations, to feel that there is some justification for encouragement: because last year we saw the direct communications link established between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97); the decision not to station or orbit weapons of mass destruction in outer space (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117); and, above all, the agreement to stop nuclear weapon tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

Those are the first steps which have been taken since the last war to curb the senseless arms race, and they were the result of long and at times very difficult preparatory work that was done here. This demonstrates, I think, the truth of what I said at the last session of the General Assembly: that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is the most effective forum for disarmament discussions which has yet been established under the auspices of the United Nations (A/C.1/PV.1313, p.21). Canada, which has participated in disarmament negotiations since their beginning in the United Nations --- and I need not emphasize this --- will continue to support wholeheartedly the work of this Committee.

At the moment my main concern --- and I am sure it is shared by all of you --- is that the impetus created by the agreements reached last year must not be lost; for a break-through was effected last year, and it is our responsibility to make sure that we follow up those first steps with further advances this year towards slowing and then halting the arms race.

This morning I should like to limit myself to the discussion of a number of issues on which my Government believes that real progress towards agreement is possible in the near future. Of course, Canada continues to regard the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament as the main task of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. But I believe that the Committee's detailed examination of the disarmament problem has convinced all members that the way to general disarmament must be prepared by agreement on what are called collateral measures.

The crucial problem of how to reduce, and finally eliminate, nuclear weapon vehicles from the arsenals of the nations has been long and vigorously debated. Unfortunately, no agreement has been reached so far; but it would be wrong, I think, to say that the discussion has not yielded some results. The work the

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Committee has done on that central problem has given us all a better understanding of the basic difficulties involved; and it has led one of the major military Powers -- the Soviet Union -- to make significant amendments to its original proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Canada hopes that further negotiations here will serve to increase the area of common ground on this issue.

However, there still remain great differences in the views of the two sides on how nuclear weapon vehicles should be reduced in number and finally abolished. In the absence of agreement, the great military Powers are adding continually to their stocks of such armaments. We cannot fail to observe this, and in my view it shows us very clearly that we must explore the possibility of checking the arms race in this particular field by adopting certain collateral measures that are before the Committee.

My Government believes that the Conference should select from among the following collateral measures those which, taken either singly or in combination, are most likely to lead to early agreement, and should concentrate its attention upon them during the next period of its work;

First, the freeze of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles proposed by the President of the United States (ENDC/120);

Second, the destruction of a number of long-range nuclear bombing aircraft proposed in different forms by the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/123; ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.)

Third, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons;

Fourth, the cessation of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and diversion of existing stocks to peaceful uses;

Fifth, the establishment of a system of observation posts to prevent surprise attack;

Sixth, a comprehensive test ban; and

Seventh, the strengthening of the United Nations capacity to keep the peace.

First, I should like to devote special attention to the proposal (ENDC/120) which President Johnson submitted to the Conference in his message at the beginning of this year: that there should be a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles. The adoption of that proposal would, my Government believes, greatly facilitate the subsequent reduction of these, the most



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costly and potentially dangerous of all armaments. Let us agree to halt the present upward spiral in the numbers of strategic missiles and bombers: let us agree to stop where we are now. That would help us to find an agreed method to reverse the process, to begin disarmament in this field. Canada firmly believes that the Committee should devote the most careful attention to this proposal for a freeze of these means of delivering the weapons which both sides now hold in such devastating quantities.

We are all aware of a proposal which, while it is not formally before this Conference, the Government of Poland has recently circulated for another kind of "freeze" -- of nuclear bombs and warheads in a certain area of central Europe (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 10,11). My Government will be replying in the near future to the memorandum it has received on this subject. I shall say no more now than that we welcome every sincere effort by any nation, and especially by any nation represented at this table, to find solutions to the problems of how to begin disarmament. We recognize the constructive part often played by the representatives of Poland in disarmament discussions. We do find objections to the Polish "freeze" proposal, of which we shall be informing the Polish Government in our reply. However, I should like to say that some elements of that proposal are worthy of further study in this Committee with a view to finding a combination of measures preliminary to disarmament which would be acceptable to both sides as mutually advantageous.

There are other proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States which, if adopted, could have an immediate effect in reducing the dangers created by the enormous aggregations of nuclear-bombing aircraft and nuclear-headed rockets. Last week the representative of the United States presented in some detail, as the Committee knows, the proposal of his country for beginning the destruction of certain types of bombing aircraft now (*ibid.*, pp. 5 et seq.). There is also before the Conference a counter-proposal by the Soviet Union for the destruction of all bombers (ENDC/123). My Government warmly welcomes that offer by both those countries to begin the disarmament process with the actual physical destruction of some major armaments. One of the best features of that approach is that it would involve only the simplest sort of verification. An early agreement to send to the scrapheap some of the major means which the great Powers now have of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets would reassure a sometimes sceptical world that

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the great Powers were really serious about disarmament. It would also ensure that those aircraft -- obsolescent by super-Power standards -- would not be sold to lesser Powers, in whose hands they might threaten neighbouring countries.

It would be an outstanding achievement if the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee could report to the coming session of the General Assembly that the Powers had agreed on the destruction of a large number of bombers. In my view, this Committee should try to reach an arrangement which would cover as many bombers as is feasible at the moment; but it should not invite delay or even failure by trying to extend it too far. Once the process of actual physical destruction has been set in motion, we could consider the possibility of broadening the scope of this measure to include other types of nuclear weapon carriers, including some missiles, as I note was suggested by Mr. Thomas. We therefore hope that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will pursue vigorously the prospects for early action which those proposals offer.

While neither side has been prepared up to the present time to accept in their present form any of the collateral measures proposed by the other, I believe that a number of the proposals could be related in a way which would assist in the reconciliation of views. For example, if the Soviet Union has misgivings that a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles would not ensure halting the over-all arms race, it might be convinced if an agreement on the freeze were combined with an agreement to undertake simultaneously the physical destruction of certain types of bombers on the lines of the United States proposal.

Then, the Soviet Union has urged that there be an early agreement on a reduction of military budgets (ENDC/123). I think that all nations would welcome a reduction of military expenditures, and the unilateral moves which have been made in this respect by the United States and the Soviet Union have received world-wide commendation. In passing, I may say that my own country has made a reduction in its defence spending this year. I think that all countries represented here would certainly be anxious, given the proper conditions, to see a reduction everywhere of military expenditure. In this connexion I have noted that, in the view of the Soviet Union, while the stopping of production of strategic nuclear weapon carriers would immediately produce significant savings in one sector of the military expenditures of the greater Powers, there is a danger that the resources so liberated

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might be used to increase the numbers of short-range missiles and conventional weapons (ENDC/PV.170, p.42). Perhaps this could be prevented by introducing a verified system of budgetary limitation.

My country welcomes the importance which this Committee is giving to the vital matter of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons: that is to say, preventing an increase in the number of States with an independent capacity for waging nuclear war. We are glad that both the Soviet Union and the United States have included this item in their lists of collateral measures. The partial test ban is a first step to check an increase in the number of nuclear Powers, and this Committee has been enjoined by a resolution of the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1910 (XVIII); ENDC/116) to continue its search for a comprehensive test ban. We must now, therefore, seek to agree on further guarantees against the grave dangers which the spreading of nuclear weapons would present both to the prospects for disarmament and to the peace of the world.

The basic position of my country in this respect is governed by the terms of the Irish resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1961. We continue to support the terms of that resolution, which call for the conclusion of an agreement which would contain certain provisions --

"... under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons" (A/RES/1665 (XVI), para.1)

At the same time we recognize that, even without such a universal agreement as is called for in that resolution, there are important steps which can and should now be taken to help to prevent wider dissemination. The United States has among its proposals a number of specific suggestions for early action. The most far-reaching of those proposals involves the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and the transfer of agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses (ENDC/120). Not only, of course, is that measure

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directly relevant to the solution of the non-dissemination problem, but its implementation would mean that the first all-important step had been taken towards actual nuclear disarmament.

My country, as one of the States with a highly-developed atomic industry, is particularly interested in another of President Johnson's proposals related to non-dissemination, and that is the application of appropriate safeguards over transfers for peaceful uses of fissile materials and related equipment (ibid.). This is a question of special concern to us, since we have been actively associated recently in a number of important projects to assist other countries in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore we warmly welcome the progressive development of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard system, and have been greatly heartened by the growing co-operation which has taken place in the extension of an effective safeguard system. In this context we believe that the recent proposals of the United States Government (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 14 et seq.), involving as they do the progressive acceptance by the developed nuclear Powers of safeguards, are a great step forward. The application of safeguards would yield experience highly relevant to the problems of controlling nuclear disarmament. Therefore it is a matter of concern to this Committee and deserves its close attention.

I listened with great interest this morning, as I am sure we all did, to what Mr. Thomas said on the subject of observation posts; and we shall look upon the paper (ENDC/130) which is an annex to his interesting statement as a positive contribution on this particular subject. We welcome the presentation of the working paper because we think it will assist the Committee in focussing its discussion both on how a system of observation posts could lessen the danger of surprise attack, and on the practical problems involved in the establishment of such a system. The representative of Nigeria pointed out recently (ENDC/PV.176, p.19) that measures to prevent the risk of war -- although both sides have made proposals in this area -- have not yet received the attention which he thought they deserved at this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. With the submission of the United Kingdom paper, the Canadian delegation looks forward to the opening now of constructive discussion on this subject, both at the co-Chairmen's meetings and in the Conference.

(Mr. Martin, Canada)

Since both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers have made suggestions with respect to observation posts in the context of measures to reduce the danger of war, this subject seems to us a promising collateral measure for discussion at this time; and, as so many delegations observed at the last session of the General Assembly, we hoped -- and I continue to hope -- that we shall reach agreement on this subject before too much time has expired. A system of observation posts, by providing assurance against surprise attack, would in the Canadian view result in a significant decrease in East-West tension. Canada believes that the establishment of an appropriate system of such posts would lead to progress in disarmament negotiations and, indeed, perhaps to progress on the main political problems dividing East and West.

There is one other subject that I should like to mention. It is the development of adequate peace-keeping machinery. I do not think I need to remind the members of this Committee of the importance which my country attaches to this subject. Canada, as is known, has recently been intimately associated with the problems of United Nations peace-keeping, as a result of the tragic happenings in Cyprus. I am sure that my colleagues here will understand when I say that Canada takes pride in the role it has assumed over the years in a series of situations where the United Nations has been called upon to fulfil its Charter responsibilities to preserve the peace. In the Suez crisis, in the Congo, in the Yemen and, most recently, in Cyprus, Canada has met what it regards as an obligation to contribute to the efforts of the United Nations to preserve international peace and security. Outside the context of the United Nations, Canada has participated, together with India and Poland, for nearly ten years now in the International Supervisory Commission in Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. My Government places a high value on the efforts of those bodies to preserve peace and stability in South-East Asia. As a result of those experiences, we have become convinced that better organization of United Nations peace-keeping forces is a most important objective.

At the last session of the General Assembly my Prime Minister made specific suggestions on what States could do to enable the United Nations to respond more effectively and promptly when a force was required to assist in the re-establishment of peaceful conditions (A/PV.1208, provisional, pp.41-45). As recently as 21 March Mr. Pearson said on this matter;

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"For years now at the United Nations Canada has taken a lead in advocating a permanent international force which will be organized and equipped and available to move in swiftly to keep the peace in these danger spots. How long are we going to have to improvise, to rely on a few members of the United Nations to carry the burden and do the job which should be done by the United Nations as a whole?"

He was, of course, influenced in making that observation by the haphazard unprepared arrangements that attended the situation which led to the establishment of the international force in Cyprus. He continued:

"I still hope to see the day when we will have an organized, equipped and genuine international force under the national control of the Members but available for use at a moment's notice."

The Canadian Government believes wholeheartedly in the peace-keeping rôle of the United Nations, and we will support all moves to increase its ability to perform that rôle with increasing effectiveness.

I mention this question now because the development and strengthening of peace-keeping machinery and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes have a direct relation to the negotiations on disarmament in this Committee. The longer-term relevance of peace-keeping to disarmament is demonstrated by the fact that the disarmament plans of both the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) include provisions for the development of peace-keeping methods. As nations in the course of disarmament give up the means which they now have to preserve their national security, it is essential that alternative methods of preserving that security should be progressively established. It is clear, therefore, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has a responsibility to discuss the development of adequate peace-keeping machinery in the context of disarmament.

But, besides the long-term problem -- how to solve international disputes and keep the peace in a disarmed world -- we have the problems of peace-keeping of yesterday and of today, that is, before the process of disarmament has begun. We must be prepared to cope with the same kind of problems until that process begins. The lessons of recent experience should guide us in planning for the long-term goal;

(Mr. Martin, Canada)

and in planning peace-keeping methods and machinery for the nearer future we should have that long-term goal in mind. I believe that study of these long-term problems in this Committee can usefully complement the continuing efforts in the broader forum of the United Nations to lay firmer foundations for the Organization's peace-keeping function.

Finally, I should like to reaffirm my faith and that of my Government in the work of this Committee as a negotiating body which can make real progress in the months ahead towards the solution of disarmament problems. We attach great importance to the institution of the co-Chairmen. That arrangement encourages informal bilateral discussions, in which we have always had strong belief. The Moscow-Washington "hot line" arrangement (ENDC/97) was a by-product of those discussions, and I hope that there will be further achievements and agreements as a result of these bilateral discussions. May I say that the presence on this Committee of the uncommitted nations has, in our judgment, strengthened these discussions? World opinion is practically fully represented on this Committee as a result of the present composition of the Committee as a whole. The proposals which have been submitted, particularly in the field of collateral measures, provide ample material for constructive negotiation at this time. I have pointed out some of the proposals which, taken either singly or in some combination, do, I believe, hold out good prospects for agreement in the near future.

There has been much discussion in the past few months about whether a détente in East-West relations exists. While there is an improvement in our relations, we note that the major political problems continue to be unresolved. However, we feel that there is very strong evidence of a real improvement in East-West relations; and undoubtedly that has been made possible by the measure of limited agreement which began last August, in particular, with the initialling by the three great Powers of a test-ban agreement (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the subsequent action of over one hundred other countries which joined in support of that agreement. Therefore, some limited agreement by this Committee within the foreseeable future would have a tremendous effect in keeping up the momentum that began last August.

It is my earnest hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will concentrate its efforts wherever it seems most likely that an advance can be made, and that, having done so, the Committee will be able to report to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that we have moved closer to our goal of a disarmed and peaceful world.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): Before making a statement today, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I should like to welcome the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Mr. de Araujo Castro, and of Canada, Mr. Martin. My delegation listened attentively to the statements made by those two Ministers at our meeting last Tuesday and this morning on the respective positions of the Brazilian and Canadian Governments on disarmament issues, and we shall study them very carefully. I should like also to greet the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thomas, who is here with us again this morning.

At previous meetings of the Committee reserved for the consideration of collateral measures the Czechoslovak delegation has had occasion several times to express its position on the order of consideration of individual proposals. We have stressed several times, as have a number of other delegations, that the Committee should concentrate primarily on a businesslike consideration of proposals for the reduction of military budgets and the achievement of effective measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In view of the importance of those two questions, they continue to be in the foreground of the Committee's attention, as was well demonstrated by the statements made at our last meeting but one. Of particular interest to us was the statement made by the representative of Nigeria, who again stressed (ENDC/PV.176, pp.18 et seq.) the importance of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union for a 10 to 15 per cent cut in military budgets (ENDC/123). He rightly pointed out that the arguments adduced by those delegations which for the time being did not appear to favour a cut in military expenditures continued to be unconvincing.

When listening to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative this morning we found it very difficult to understand why, when disarmament should be approached through the reduction of military budgets -- to quote the words used by Mr. Thomas --

"... an essential prerequisite is an intensive but rapid course in the laboratory." (supra, p. 7)

I must say that we are not convinced by the argument put forward by Mr. Thomas, for it remains an indisputable fact that ~~the~~ reduction of military budgets is a



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feasible measure which could be carried out relatively easier than other measures in the field of disarmament. It is for that reason that the Soviet proposal has such wide support not only in this Committee but in the whole world. In our view, the most decisive factor is the will of governments to contribute to the lessening of international tension and to work resolutely to bring about an early halt to the armaments race.

Bearing all this in mind, we are convinced that the time is ripe to proceed to specific consideration of both Soviet proposals concerning the reduction of military budgets. We also find interesting the suggestions contained in the working paper submitted by Brazil (ENDC/126), which were referred to again in the statement of the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mr. de Araujo Castro, at our meeting on 24 March, when, among other things, he reminded us of the need --

"... to move away from the protracted general debate which has been taking place and move towards the consideration of specific issues." (ENDC/PV.177, p.11)

The situation is similar in respect of the proposed steps to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons. That issue also is more than ripe for solution, and so far not a single delegation has opposed consideration of it. On the contrary, all delegations, at least in their statements, have shared the view that it is important for the future development of the world that there should be a really effective agreement banning dissemination of nuclear weapons to countries which do not possess them at present.

In this connexion I should like to recall the interesting statements made at the 176th meeting by the representatives of India and Nigeria, and at our meeting today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Martin. It is in particular the thoughtful words of Mr. Obi which deserve, to our mind, a careful consideration by those who advocate the plan to create a multilateral force in NATO. I have in mind especially that part of his intervention where Mr. Obi stressed that in any case the multilateral nuclear force would certainly result in a proliferation of nuclear weapons which would be the contrary to an effective solution of this issue. Permit me to quote the conclusion reached by the delegation of Nigeria, that, to use Mr. Obi's words, it considers --

"...this increase neither necessary nor helpful to the over-all progress of the task with which the Committee is charged." (ENDC/PV.176, p.15)

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

It is therefore evident that the proposals for a reduction of military budgets and for measures preventing a further dissemination of nuclear weapons quite rightly appeared in the centre of our deliberations, and that it is only the attitude of the Western delegations towards these proposals which has prevented us so far from making headway and thus reaching the concrete results in our work which are more and more impatiently expected from us by the world public.

On behalf of my delegation I should like now to make a few comments on the United States proposal for a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). First of all I should like to emphasize that, as regards the freeze proposals in general, we do not oppose them a priori; we do not take a negative position on them per se in principle. However, we are of the opinion that not always and not everywhere -- that is, in each area of disarmament or collateral measures -- will the freeze proposals have positive effects. Sometimes, in view of different circumstances, the effects may even be negative, since the proposals for a freeze may become not only useless but even harmful.

The freeze would no doubt be of importance in a number of spheres. It might play a positive role in building a barrier, for example, against the undesirable dissemination of nuclear weapons to some new spheres where they have not penetrated so far. I have in mind, for example, General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII) (ENDC/117) on refraining from the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Such a freeze, whose materialization in substance rests on mutual confidence, is useful in all respects, since it contributes to the cause of peace and creates favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament.

Another example of a freeze of a similar nature which would be both useful and appropriate is the 1959 Antarctic Agreement<sup>1/</sup> prohibiting the placing and testing of nuclear weapons in that area, which so far is not polluted by military preparations.

The proposal for adopting effective steps to prevent a further dissemination of nuclear weapons in its way also represents a freeze and, no doubt, a useful and needed one. It is designed to prevent the enlargement of the number of States which have these weapons at present. Within this category, in principle also, belong the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world and, by its substance, the latest proposal of the Polish People's Republic dealing with a freeze of nuclear weapons in central Europe (ENDC/PV.176, pp.10, 11).

<sup>1/</sup> Department of State Bulletin, 21 December 1959, pp.914-917.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

In the present context the following question naturally poses itself: what is common to all these measures, and why is a freeze useful and desirable in the spheres which I have just mentioned? In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation the following are the determining factors:

First, in their substance these are not measures of a purely disarmament nature, but their implementation would exert a positive effect on future developments, because they would prevent a dissemination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction into other spheres or to other States or groups of States.

Secondly, these measures are easily feasible from the point of view of the security of States, because they do not impair the sovereignty of States and do not weaken their defence capability. We believe that what is particularly important is the fact that they do not require broad control, since we should keep in mind that any measures within a freeze are measures which are not of a purely disarmament nature.

Thirdly, these are proposals which may be translated into practice as collateral measures contributing to a slowing-down of the arms race and relaxation of international tension, and facilitating the improvement of international relations by creating a better atmosphere of confidence among nations.

Those are some of the characteristic features that should be taken into consideration in judging and evaluating the circumstances in which a freeze might be resorted to as a means of facilitating our advance to reach our common objective.

The situation is qualitatively different in regard to the applicability of measures for a freeze in a sphere which is part and parcel of the disarmament process. Such is the case with the freeze proposal which covers, for example, the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as proposed by the United States (ENDC/120). Here it is appropriate to examine what would be the meaning of such a proposal from the point of view of disarmament, and what would be its effect in the present stage of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Such examination is even more appropriate when this proposal is presented by the Western Powers as a proposal on the same footing with disarmament. Here we do not even mention the attempts to make such a freeze a precondition for starting the disarmament process itself.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

Every proposal of the nature of the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles must necessarily be examined, first and foremost, by the following two main criteria:

First, whether the proposed measure is appropriate and really effective under the present conditions; whether it contributes to the elimination or at least the alleviation of the menace of a nuclear war; whether it improves the international climate; and whether it increases or strengthens the security of States and contributes to disarmament;

Secondly, whether the required control corresponds to the scope and significance of the measure itself, and whether it is adequate or not.

Although with the utmost good will we have endeavoured to find a positive core in the United States proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we cannot but state that the facts do not allow us to do so.

What would be the significance of a verified freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from the point of view of eliminating or at least diminishing the danger of a nuclear war under prevailing conditions? It is very well known that, as far as nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery are concerned, there exists at present the possibility of causing multiple destruction of the other side. In fact the United States freeze proposal would not lead to the destruction of a single delivery vehicle; on the contrary, it would tend to preserve the present dangerous state of affairs through a binding treaty formula.

The representatives of the Western Powers try to prove that their proposal would have a salutary effect in halting the continued quantitative and qualitative growth and perfecting of strategic delivery vehicles. Such assertions sound completely unconvincing in the light of the well-known facts. Suffice it to adduce the latest facts and figures recently published inter alia in the United States journal Newsweek dated 9 March 1964. An article dealing with the activities of the United States Atomic Energy Commission says, inter alia:

"The plain fact is that the U.S. now has more nuclear weapons than it will ever conceivably need".

It goes on to say:

"With more than 80,000 warheads in the U.S. stockpile and a limited test ban in effect, President Johnson recently ordered a 25 per cent cut in the production of enriched uranium and plutonium."

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

That is clear evidence that United States officials themselves have reached the conclusion that the continued production of nuclear warheads is unnecessary from the military point of view and is a waste of tremendous economic means.

The situation is similar in the field of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and as a matter of fact the freeze proposal would not lead to the total discontinuance of their further production. Furthermore, it would not cover the production of such types of delivery vehicles as the Polaris missiles and the nuclear submarines designed for their launching. According to the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers, it would not stand in the way of the realization of either the plans for creating a NATO multilateral force, or the United Kingdom plans for the building-up of a nuclear submarine fleet equipped with Polaris missiles.

It is therefore evident that the proposed freeze of strategic delivery vehicles would allow unrestricted possibilities for a further intensification of armaments in practically all those areas, in harmony with the present military and strategic concepts of the West. From our point of view, therefore, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Tsarapkin, was fully justified in stating on 12 March that the United States was presenting its proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at a time when the weight of its armament efforts was being shifted from the field of strategic means of delivery to the field of medium- and short-range delivery vehicles and conventional armaments (ENDC/PV.174, p.48). In such conditions, how is it possible to attach any importance to the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles?

In ending my statement, I should like to deal in a few words with the question of control envisaged in the United States proposal. It has been emphasized that the freeze should be verified. The representatives of the Western Powers try to convince us that, as they see it, the question of control should not be an insurmountable obstacle in this respect. However, so far they have offered no clarification in this connexion and have given us no facts that would justify that assertion. In our view their contention is in fact only another attempt to create false, unfounded illusions, because the concept of control in the United States proposal gives rise to serious problems. After all, the proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles touches upon the most sensitive area in relation to safeguarding the defence and security of States. Moreover, as I have said, the United States proposal is far from being a disarmament measure, and its adoption would not prevent States from continuing the armaments race in practically all fields.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

Certain indications in the statements of the Western delegations, and of the United States delegation in particular, make it clear that the Western Powers would like to carry out such control measures in connexion with the proposed freeze as would make it possible for them practically to have access to the entire territories of other States. On the pretext of verifying possible clandestine production of means of delivery, they would be in a position to demand an inspection at any place in the territory of a particular State.

In such conditions it is evident that, both from the point of view of the measures to be effected and from the point of view of the control called for, the proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would not contribute to enhancing the security of States and strengthening mutual trust in international relations — not to mention alleviating the danger of a nuclear war — but rather would have the opposite result.

Finally, I should like to add that the proposal for a freeze of strategic means of delivery gives rise to serious reservations also from the point of view of the necessity of ensuring security equally for all States in the course of the disarmament process. What kind of "equal security" would there be if the United States proposal were put into effect? It is evident that the freeze would apply to the production of the basic means of defence of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. On the other hand, the production of medium- and short-range delivery vehicles and their deployment at foreign bases in the vicinity of the socialist States would continue.

It follows from what I have just said that the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles does not represent an acceptable solution for this problem. If mankind is to be freed from the danger of a nuclear war, effective disarmament measures must be adopted. First and foremost, nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery must be eliminated, along with an additional guarantee in the form of the "nuclear umbrella" envisaged in the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1)

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): First of all, while Mr. Paul Martin is still here, I should like to associate my delegation with the welcome which you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Committee who have spoken before me have extended to him. For me the pleasure is a very special one, partly because I have had the privilege of knowing and admiring Mr. Martin for more than ten years, and partly because my current responsibilities include the honour of representing my country in Ottawa.

Like all those seated around this table, I listened to Mr. Martin's thoughtful address with the greatest interest; it reflected Mr. Martin's long and abiding interest in the problems of disarmament, and will receive the close and careful study of the Burmese delegation. I was particularly interested in Mr. Martin's idea of combining consideration of some of the collateral measures. As my statement will show, our thoughts too have been turning in that direction.

I should also like to extend an equally warm welcome to our esteemed former colleague who now holds with distinction the high post of Foreign Minister of Brazil. His inspiring speech last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 5 et seq.) and his presence here today reflect anew his deep interest in the work of the Committee. My delegation is also happy to have in our midst once again the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Thomas.

On studying the records of the Thursday meetings over the past two months, we cannot help coming to the conclusion that both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed an uncanny ability to pick out and put forward for discussion collateral or initial measures which prove unacceptable to the other side, even for discussion, at any rate in the form in which they are presented. This has been true even where the collateral measure concerned appears in both the United States and the Soviet Union lists.

We subscribe to the view that this situation does not call for undue despondency — far less despair. On the other hand, we do not think it is an entirely healthy or happy situation. It seems to us that one explanation for this rather remarkable state of affairs is that to some extent the measures proposed by the two sides are complementary. They are complete only when they are considered together or in combination. When they are separated, their incompleteness makes them acceptable

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

to one side but unacceptable to the other, and vice versa. Pursuing that thought, we have tried to consider which of the collateral or initial measures which have so far been put forward, and which in their present form are unacceptable to one side or the other, might become more acceptable if they could be considered in combination.

As my delegation sees it, a possible and perhaps the most obvious combination is President Johnson's proposal for a freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles (ENDC/120); the Soviet Union's proposal for agreed reductions in military budgets, and the Soviet Union's proposal — apparently partially inspired and now accepted in part by the United States — for the destruction of air-force bombers (ENDC/123). Let me now deal with each of those three components and explain how in our view they complement each other.

In its statement of 20 February (ENDC/PV.168, pp.5 et seq.) my delegation set out its preliminary views with regard to the first two of those three components. Since then we have given study to the arguments which have been levelled against them, and I now propose to consider them in detail.

I should also like to recall at this stage that the Burmese delegation has always recognized the need for containing the disarmament problem while we continue to search for a disarmament agreement. In the very first statement made in this Committee by my delegation, on 21 March 1962, the Foreign Minister of Burma said:

"As my delegation sees it, the search for disarmament consists not only in looking for agreed ways and means of reducing and finally eliminating existing armed forces and armaments: we must also ensure that our task does not grow while we are busily engaged in looking for a solution." (ENDC/PV.6, p.24)

It is because of that belief that my delegation welcomed the partial test ban treaty and the agreement not to station nuclear weapons in outer space. It is possible to argue that those do not constitute measures of disarmament; but who can deny that the disarmament problem has been prevented from getting worse and more intractable because of these agreements?



(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

We feel the same way about the principle underlying the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles. As we tried to bring out in our statement of 20 February, we believe that the time has come to put a stop to all armament production and development, beginning with the more dangerous and sensitive weapons and proceeding all the way down to the simplest conventional weapons of today. That may not be disarmament in the strict sense of the word, but it would be a big step in that direction and would make agreement on disarmament so much easier to reach and to implement.

At the same time, we cannot but be attentive to the concerns of the Soviet Union with regard to this proposal, which, as we understand it, fall under three main headings. They are, first, that the acceptance of the proposal would not put an end to the arms race, since the parties to the agreement would be free to continue to develop and manufacture weapons not covered by the agreement; second, that such an agreement would not eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over mankind; third, that this would simply be control over armaments and therefore unacceptable. I should now like to deal with each of those three headings.

As for the first, we feel that it must be admitted that the acceptance of the freeze proposal is not by itself going to put an end to the arms race. That could happen only if there were a complete cessation of production of armaments in all its forms. But it seems to my delegation that a freeze of the development and production of strategic nuclear missiles, provided that by "strategic" is meant a good deal more than intercontinental ballistic missiles and intercontinental bombers, would in fact be a sizeable step towards halting the arms race. Therefore we hope that the United States delegation will prove flexible and realistic in its interpretation of the term "strategic".

Further, in order to meet the legitimate concern of the Soviet Union that the savings resulting from the adoption of a freeze agreement, as interpreted in the manner to which I have referred, may not be diverted to the production of other armaments, we would suggest that such an agreement should be complemented by a parallel agreement amongst the major armed Powers to reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent as proposed by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

At this point I should like to make a few brief observations on the question of the reduction of military budgets. We have listened with the greatest attention to the objections raised by our Western colleagues with regard to this matter, but I regret to say that we have not been convinced by those arguments. When the amounts proposed for reduction are so great, it seems to us almost defeatist to suggest that ways and means cannot be devised to ensure that the reductions proposed are actually being effected by the participants to an agreement. We cannot but be impressed by the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union apparently had no difficulty in accepting at face value each other's unilateral announcements of modest cuts in their budgets for 1964. Why, then, should it be so difficult to verify the proposed reductions of substantially great magnitude?

No one, not even the Soviet Union, has suggested that the implementation of any such agreement to reduce military budgets should be left to trust. Given good will it should not, we believe, be too difficult, certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise verification machinery which would give reasonable assurance that the agreement to reduce budgets by such substantial percentages was actually being faithfully implemented.

The second main objection of the Soviet Union to the United States freeze proposal is that it would not eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over mankind. That, unfortunately, is true. In fact, that terrible threat will remain with us until general and complete disarmament, which remains the objective of all of us, is finally achieved. It might even be argued that the over-kill capacity possessed by both sides is already so great that any further increase of that capacity would be academic. But, even if we accept this as a grotesque fact of contemporary life, we have still to reckon with the fact that disarmament remains our final and ultimate objective, and that the more we pile up these terrible weapons the more difficult it will become to reach an agreement to destroy them. As we have had occasion to say previously, if we continue this piling-up process long enough we may well reach the point where disarmament becomes a practical impossibility.

The third main objection of the Soviet Union is that the proposed verified freeze would become, in effect, not a disarmament measure but merely a control over armament. Until we have had further clarification from the United States

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

delegation of the verification aspects of that proposal, we cannot make any final pronouncement on such a characterization. But it had been our impression that the verification proposal would apply only to the production and developmental centres in regard to the weapons covered by the agreement, and that control would not extend to the numbers and locations of the strategic delivery weapons already existing on the date when the agreement came into force. If that is the case, it would be our hope that it should not be too difficult to reach agreement on verification arrangements which would adequately meet the limited objectives I have just mentioned.

If these two complementary agreements were to be completed by a third agreement, a truly meaningful agreement on the physical destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, we should in fact have embarked on the process of disarmament, though not precisely in the manner envisaged in the plans of either the Soviet Union or the United States. By "truly meaningful" in this context I mean an agreement representing a realistic and significant disarmament measure. In the view of my delegation, that would have to go further than the proposal submitted recently by the United States for the destruction of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers over a two-year period (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.) With all due respect to the United States delegation, we consider that to be an inadequate measure -- inadequate as regards types, quantities and rate of destruction -- whose aim, as a matter of fact, would be the laudable one of ensuring that these bombers do not get into the hands of third nations, but which would otherwise, unless tied in with a freeze, as suggested earlier, do nothing to prevent the two super-Powers from increasing their destructive capability further by replacing these obsolete bombers with more modern means of delivery.

The bolder and more ambitious Soviet proposal for the destruction of all bombers (ENDC/123) is in our view an improvement in this respect; but we are constrained to say that it has the built-in difficulty that apparently it envisages the destruction of bomber fleets by all States not all of which regard them as obsolete. Here again, unless linked with a freeze of the further production and development of strategic means of nuclear delivery, such an agreement would also result eventually in the replacement of the bomber fleets of the super-Powers by even more efficient and deadly means of delivery.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

We hope, therefore, that it will be possible to couple this proposal to destroy bombers with a freeze of strategic missiles and also with the proposed reduction of military budgets, and that the agreement to destroy bombers will cover not only the most obsolete types, in super-Power terms, but also some of the later models. In addition, we should like to reiterate our proposal (ENDC/PV.161, pp.7,8) that some missiles might also be thrown in for good measure, as an earnest that the super-Powers really mean business. The super-Powers have so many missiles now that such a gesture would cost them nothing and would do much good to the cause of disarmament.

Those are the thoughts which I wished to share with the Committee today. Even if they may seem at first sight to be far-fetched, I believe that some reflection will show that they may have some merit.

Before concluding my statement I should like to make a brief reference to a matter which was touched upon by the Foreign Minister of Brazil in his speech on 24 March: that is, the cessation of underground nuclear tests. As Mr. de Araújo Castro reminded us (ENDC/PV.177, p.9) we have a special mandate from the General Assembly to consider this question with a sense of urgency (A/RES/1910 (XVIII); ENDC/116). We are now in the third month of our deliberations in 1964, and, although this item appears on the lists of collateral measures of both the Soviet Union and the United States, nothing has been done so far with regard to it.

Consequently my delegation wonders whether the time has not arrived for us to consider reactivating the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which, as in the past, might report to the main Committee from time to time on the progress of its deliberations. As a starting point the Sub-Committee might consider the constructive suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of Brazil that underground tests above a certain range, which both sides agree can be identified through the existing monitoring system, might be added to the interdiction area of the Moscow Treaty. Such an approach would not require either side to give up its basic position, and therefore has much to commend it. We hope that these ideas will receive the careful consideration of the Committee, and particularly of the co-Chairmen.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): First of all I would like to associate myself, on behalf of my delegation and as co-Chairman, with the welcome that has been extended to Mr. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. I would also like to welcome back to the deliberations of this Committee Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State in the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom. We have listened with great interest this morning to the speeches of those two colleagues, which highlighted a number of the very important collateral measures now before the Committee.

I also listened with great interest to the other statements made thus far. We shall be addressing ourselves at future meetings to certain of the subjects raised in those statements.

This morning, however, I would like to speak primarily in support of the statement on observation posts made by the representative of the United Kingdom. I would like in particular to express the gratitude of my Government for the effort which the United Kingdom has made in developing a working paper on this subject. (ENDC/130). That working paper will undoubtedly provide an excellent basis for discussion of this important but complex matter. It appears to point up the problems which we must solve if we are to make progress on this measure. The United States delegation believes that this paper will be of great help in advancing the work of the Committee.

On 16 August 1963 the representative of the United States spoke on the subject of observation posts (ENDC/PV.152, pp.6 et seq.) The position of the United States, put forward at that time, was that a properly-designed system of observation posts would be a measure which, in and by itself, could reduce the risk of war. The position of the United States is the same today. The United States believes that a properly-designed system of observation posts would be a measure which in itself would advance the cause of peace. It would be of value in enhancing military security for both sides, in strengthening international confidence, and in facilitating progress towards future arms control and disarmament measures.

The United States, in supporting the suggestions put forward by the United Kingdom, does so in the belief that they will unite, not divide, this Conference. We say that because both sides have suggested that such a system of observation posts would reduce the risk of war. We should examine what each of us has in mind regarding the requirements for an effective system. We should explore together the nature, scope and function of such a system.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The nature of such a system should be such that it is capable of providing prompt and reliable information on unusual military movements and events. By providing early warning of any indication of possible preparations for hostile actions, it would increase the time available for diplomatic or other action to avert any threat of hostilities. It should be capable of providing timely and reliable information during an international crisis, and thus help to reduce the risk of war through misunderstanding of the posture of the other side. It would be an instrument available to each side through which concrete evidence of peaceful intent would be provided and through which unusual events which otherwise might be subject to misleading interpretations could be clarified.

The scope of such a system should include posts established by mutual agreement in North America, the United Kingdom, Europe and the Soviet Union. The precise location of posts in those areas is a matter upon which we should conduct the most direct and intensive exploration. I assume also that any system established at this time would of necessity have to be partly experimental and might be subject to periodic review.

Discussions about the functions of the observation posts may be considered the most significant part of our deliberations on this subject. Each side will of course have in mind a number of theoretical threats against which an observation-post system might prove useful. But, to be of value, an observation-post system need not deal with the entire range of possible threats. Indeed, it would not be feasible to devise a system which could deal with all imaginable threats. What is important is that the system should have a demonstrable, practical utility for those threats with which it is designed by our mutual agreement to deal.

It would not be in anyone's interest to establish a system having a purely symbolic purpose and no practical utility. Such a system could be exploited for unhelpful political purposes with no compensating gain in military security. Indeed, it might even generate a false sense of security and, in so doing, exert a destabilizing influence on the military situation.

Both sides will have an equal interest in devising appropriate safeguards to prevent the use of posts for espionage or any other clandestine purpose. We are certain that this can be done. For our part, we have in mind a system which operates

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

openly, in full view of the host government. Any improper activity on the part of observers which could cast suspicion on the use which was being made of the posts would defeat a major purpose of this measure, which is to build confidence.

It will be important to reach a full understanding on the rights, duties and functions of the observers. The reliability of their communications and the degree of access and freedom of movement which they are to enjoy will in large measure determine the effectiveness of the system.

The complexities of a measure of this nature are such that we must anticipate the need for extended discussion. Various political, technical and military aspects will need to be examined in detail. I suggest that it would be appropriate and desirable for the co-Chairmen to consider how the examination of such matters might be facilitated. The delegations of the nations most directly concerned will probably also wish to exchange views on this matter.

Here is another area in which we hope it will prove possible to move towards an agreement which would maintain the momentum achieved during the past year. The United States will do everything in its power to contribute to a fruitful discussion.

Before terminating my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few observations on the discussion we had on 19 March concerning the proposal to destroy an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. If I gathered the sense of the statement by my distinguished colleague Mr. Tsarapkin correctly, he summed it up in the following words:

"Acceptance by the Committee of the United States proposal for the gradual elimination of B-47 bomber aircraft would be an unwarranted endorsement of this United States proposal, which is not a disarmament measure. This proposal is in fact a manifestation of rearmament, which means increasing the efficacy of armaments and intensifying the arms race." (ENDC/PV.176, pp.30,31).

Armaments, whether in active or inactive status, are still armaments. Until they are actually physically destroyed, they remain armaments.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The B-47, which we have proposed for destruction as our side of the bargain, is and will remain a very formidable bomber. For years to come, when manned by trained crews using modern tactics, it could penetrate the most formidable adversary's defences. Currently it comprises a sizeable part of our strategic delivery capabilities, and hence is a part of our deterrent to nuclear war. Even though we can see the phase-out of this type of aircraft from our active inventory, we plan to retain sizeable numbers in our mobilization reserve. Once one is placed in our mobilization reserve, it continues to represent considerable military value, since it can readily be returned to operational use.

The B-47 is a most versatile aircraft, superior in significant aspects -- and this is particularly true in regard to range -- to the TU-16. Its continued availability provides enhanced flexibility to carry out a spectrum of missions. It should be noted once again that one such aircraft can carry more destructive power than that produced by all the bomb tonnage dropped by the world's air forces during the Second World War. With the greatest respect and in no sense of controversy, I believe this fact should be taken into account before accepting a characterization of the destruction of at least 480 on one side and an equivalent number on the other of these weapons as an inadequate measure.

But, even if one were inclined to accept the argument that B-47s have no value once they are retired from active service, one might logically ask why the Soviet Union and other States continue to retain and store armaments, some long since retired from active service.

The fact has been established that the B-47s are armaments, and formidable ones at that. Their destruction can only be characterized as disarmament. Since a good many of these aircraft we have been discussing would be preserved for possible future use unless physically destroyed, it follows that the proposal offered by the United States is one of real disarmament: namely the physical destruction of weapons.

My distinguished colleague Ambassador Tsarapkin also spoke of --  
 "... the gradual destruction, spaced out over several years, of the obsolete United States B-47 bomber aircraft, which, as we know, are scheduled to be withdrawn from service in the United States armed forces." (ibid., p.30)



(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Again, let me point out that the term "obsolete " or "obsolescent" is a relative one. Given enough time, practically everything in the active inventory today will eventually be obsolete unless we succeed in our work here. If one were to accept the Soviet argument, then no matter where we started the destruction process it would not seem to meet the Soviet criteria for disarmament.

Acceptance of the United States freeze proposal, it should be pointed out, would ensure that there was no follow-on production to replace this bomber. That would preclude the possibility of future production of strategic bombers to which Ambassador Tsarapkin, my distinguished colleague, alluded.

In addition, the phrase "several years" is an erroneous description of the United States proposal. In order that there should be no misunderstanding on this point, let me repeat what I stated at our meeting on 19 March: that we are offering to destroy an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers at the rate of twenty per month on each side. We are prepared to continue destruction of those bombers at that rate for a period of two years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from war reserve stocks. Thus not only would the net total of bombers possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union be drastically reduced, but the potential for proliferation of these powerful weapon systems would also be greatly reduced.

In short, while these aircraft are still flying or serviceable they are a formidable sector of the weapon arsenal. Only their physical destruction would truly constitute disarmament. Frankly, I fail to see how there can be any objection to the mutual destruction of these bombers, or how our proposal can be accurately characterized as one which would push the arms race forward.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation first wishes to associate itself with the words of welcome addressed to Mr. Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, who can truly be described as a veteran of disarmament talks. His interesting and important statement in the Committee today will of course be studied by us with all the attention it undoubtedly deserves; we hope that, as a result, we may perhaps find some way of narrowing the gap between our respective positions on certain matters.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I should also like to welcome to our midst Mr. Thomas, the representative of the United Kingdom who likewise is an expert on disarmament problems and who from time to time joins our Committee and contributes to our work to the best of his endeavours.

The Committee's discussion of the Soviet Government's proposal (ENDC/123) for a reduction of 10-15 per cent in the military budgets of States has shown that, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the Committee, the implementation of this proposal would have the most beneficial effects in present circumstances. Agreement among States on a reduction of military expenditure would result in a definite slackening in the tempo of the arms race and, on the political plane, would further improve the international atmosphere and make for increased mutual trust among States. One might say that the gain for the world would be twofold -- material and political.

At our meeting on 19 March, Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, clearly and convincingly demonstrated the practical feasibility of the proposal for reducing military budgets and stressed its value as a means of slowing down the arms race:

"In our view, a reduction in military expenditures would appear to be most appropriate at this stage of our work; for, while it would have a definite and considerable impact on the over-all armaments of States it would still leave the Powers concerned the choice of deciding to which aspect of their military resources they should direct the axe."

(ENDC/PV.176, p.19)

The attempts by the Western delegations to dissuade the Committee from taking a positive decision on reducing military budgets were extremely unconvincing and, it goes without saying, could not alter anyone's view that this is a useful and timely measure. We shall not dwell on arguments such as the alleged "prematurity" of an agreement on reducing military budgets. Such an approach is tantamount to condemning the Committee to inactivity and converting it into a futile debating society, into a screen for the arms race.

Let us examine the other objections. The United States representative stated that his Government had done everything possible in the matter of military budgets and could go no further for certain constitutional or other reasons (ENDC/PV.170, p.7). Mr. de Castro, the representative of Brazil, very convincingly refuted these "constitutional" arguments (ENDC/PV.172, p.45). No

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country's constitution can in fact preclude the attainment of international agreements and, especially, of agreements which are directly designed to strengthen peace and which, in addition, could lighten the burden of the United States taxpayers.

As for the other reasons given, the facts show that they do not hold water. We recently read a report on an article by Mr. Gilpatric, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, in the magazine "Foreign Affairs". In view of the extremely responsible post recently held by Mr. Gilpatric, an opinion expressed by him is clearly authoritative, and even Mr. Gilpatric considers that the United States military budget could be reduced by 25 per cent within the next few years.

Some representatives have expressed the view in this Committee that it would help us to reach agreement if a study were made, in the Committee or in a subordinate body, of various economic, financial or technical matters connected with the structure of State budgets, the comparability of such budgets, price-fixing and other similar matters. As many of you know, similar work was once undertaken in this very building by the League of Nations. It brought no good to the peoples of the world; the live issue of disarmament merely became lost in a maze of committees and working groups. I would remind Mr. Thomas that the final result of this work of investigation was war.

The Soviet delegation does not want to see any repetition of this, and urges members of the Committee to do genuinely useful work, to agree on reducing the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent. I must say quite frankly that, however laudable the intentions of those who express such views, technical studies of any kind would merely confuse and delay matters at the present time, when there is no agreement on reducing military budgets. All proposals of this kind are merely grist to the mill of those who are attempting to prevent an agreement and are seeking pretexts -- a convenient excuse for doing so. It is no coincidence that the proposal for technical studies was so eagerly seized upon by Mr. Butler and Sir Paul Mason, and today by Mr. Thomas, all three of whom represent a Government which not only has not followed the Soviet example of reducing military budgets but is, on the contrary, increasing its military expenditure.

The United Kingdom Government having embarked on the course of increasing military expenditure and having adopted a policy of intensifying the arms race, its representatives are naturally trying to prove that their sin is not really so great,

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that others are not so very far removed from them in this respect. This was, in essence, what Mr. Thomas said at the beginning of his statement. He sought to justify the increased military expenditure of the United Kingdom, although this is not what this Committee on Disarmament expected to hear from him. Mr. Thomas tried to refute the statement made by Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (ENDC/127\*), with reference to the speech by Mr. Butler, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (ENDC/PV.169, pp.5 et seq.). But instead of refuting Mr. Gromyko's statement, he in fact confirmed it, for he made the same appeal to the Committee as did Mr. Butler: namely, that it should make a detailed study of budgetary questions without any commitments regarding a substantial reduction in the military budgets of States.

In a number of statements at recent meetings, attention has been drawn to the need for urgent steps to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. I must say at once that anyone opposing the dissemination of nuclear weapons has a firm ally in the Soviet Union. We stand for the adoption of decisive and effective steps against such dissemination. The representatives of the Western Powers, for their part, claim in the Committee that they, too, oppose the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Outside the Committee, however, the United States is engaged in intensive negotiations for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, through which West Germany would obtain access to nuclear weapons. The difference between the positions of the Soviet Union and the Western countries lies in the fact that, in our view, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons cannot be facilitated by steps which actually further their dissemination; whereas the Western Powers, on the contrary, contend that the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can be furthered by making such weapons available to those members of NATO which do not at present possess them.

Numerous events during the past few years and up to the present time testify to this paradoxical approach of the Western Powers to the solution of this problem. What is at present going on in the NATO camp is plain to everyone: the German war machine is being built up and perfected with astonishing rapidity. It is already becoming the main driving force of the North Atlantic alliance, and is largely instrumental in determining the policy of the Western Powers in matters such as nuclear armament or disarmament, a non-aggression pact, and many others. With the connivance and open assistance of their NATO allies, the West German militarists are advancing **with** ever-increasing speed towards the possession of nuclear weapons. The policy of the United States and the other leading NATO Powers is to camouflage

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the dissemination of nuclear weapons by talk about the non-dissemination of such weapons. I shall give a few specific examples.

Ten years ago, in December 1954, on the initiative of the United States, a decision was taken at the session of the NATO Council in Paris to train the armed forces of that military bloc in the use of atomic weapons. The United States had previously, in August 1954, reviewed and amended its law on atomic energy -- the so-called McMahon Act -- in order to remove any constitutional and legal obstacles to the realization of that plan -- in other words, to provide a "legal" basis for the transmission of information about atomic weapons to its NATO allies. This was the first move towards the dissemination of nuclear weapons within the NATO military bloc.

At its session in December 1957 the NATO Council took the next step in the same pernicious direction. It took a decision to provide the Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO armed forces with ballistic missiles, to establish stockpiles of nuclear warheads, and to set up atomic bases and nuclear-missile firing-pads on the territory of the west European States. Under the supervision of United States military experts, officers and men from other NATO countries, including West Germany, began to receive instruction in methods of using nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

These activities of the United States directly paved the way for the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is relevant to recall in this connexion the sound point made by the representative of India in the First Committee at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 30 November 1961:

"... if troops are trained in the use of such weapons, I do not know how long it will take a particular nation, if it is so interested, to take physical control of these weapons." (A/C. I/PV.1209, p.31)

At the session of the NATO Council in December 1956 the West German Minister of Defence laid his cards on the table for the first time and requested that the Bundeswehr should be given nuclear weapons. And, in order to remove all doubt regarding the seriousness of these claims, Dr. Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, stated in April 1957 that West Germany was entitled to atomic weapons since these were merely a development of modern artillery.

And now we see how the United States Government is complying with this request by Dr. Adenauer. On 18 March 1958 the United States sold to the Federal Republic of Germany the first 40 Matador and 300 Nike missiles, which can be fitted with nuclear warheads. On 1 March 1960 it was announced in Washington that the

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West German Government had bought a large number of Mace and Sergeant missiles in the United States. On 3 January 1964, on the very eve of the resumption of our Committee's work, United Press International reported that Pershing missiles were shortly to be supplied to the Bundeswehr. A brief report recently appeared in the press that these missiles were already becoming part of the equipment of the West German armed forces. As we all know, this missile is no toy; it can carry a half-megaton nuclear warhead -- that is, one with twenty-five times the destructive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The extent to which the Bundeswehr has already been trained for nuclear war with the assistance of the United States is shown by such facts as the publication in West Germany of many official manuals on the training of the West German armed forces for nuclear war. Manual 100/2 (Principles of Strategy for land forces in atomic war), army manual 100/3 (The technical bases for the tactical use of atomic missiles), official manual 3/3 (Duties of the soldier in conditions of atomic war), are merely a few examples.

All that the West German Bundeswehr now has to do is to acquire control over nuclear weapons through the NATO multilateral nuclear force, the establishment of which is at present under intensive consideration. That is the next step on the road leading the peoples to the inferno of a thermonuclear war. That is the crux of the problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Those who advocate the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force maintain that it would not lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, since collective and multilateral, not national, control would be involved. But how is it possible to agree that the transfer of nuclear weapons, or of information on their manufacture, to a single State would be dissemination, while the simultaneous transfer of such weapons to a group of States -- the NATO multilateral force -- would not lead to dissemination? Who could be convinced by such assertions? No one. Nor, incidentally, are they believed in the West. I should like to read out extracts from a letter written by an American and published in The New York Times:

"Yet deep doubts about M.L.F. persist, not only in the Communist world, but within NATO and apparently within our own Pentagon -- and certainly among the American people ...".

The letter continues:

"M.L.F. is today preventing the Geneva Disarmament Conference from agreeing upon a new treaty lessening the spread of nuclear weapons. The

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Soviet Union rightly wants to include in any such treaty military alliances as well as individual States to which nuclear weapons must not be disseminated. The Soviet Union rightly fears a nuclear-armed West Germany and I believe the American people and the American Government fear such an eventuality also. An M.L.F., even with an American veto, and especially without an American veto, would give the West Germans (or any great participating, non-nuclear Power) increased appetite for nuclear weapons". (New York Times International Edition, 21-22 March 1964, p.4)

That is the situation, and we cannot shrug it off. The concern evinced in that letter is very real and is shared by responsible politicians in many NATO countries. It is no coincidence that half the members of NATO refuse to have anything to do with the creation of this force. It is also significant that the Labour Party of the United Kingdom is against the creation of a multilateral nuclear force.

By means of perverted logic, the Western representatives have tried to prove in this Committee, first that West Germany does not want nuclear weapons at all; secondly, that the only way to prevent it from acquiring such weapons is to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force; and thirdly, that there is no connexion whatever between a NATO multilateral force and the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The same sort of perverted logic was resorted to by the proverbial housewife who borrowed a pot from her neighbour and returned it broken; when questioned by the owner, she replied that, first of all, she did not borrow any pot; secondly, she returned it in one piece, and thirdly, it already had a crack in it when she borrowed it.

It may be pointed out in this connexion that, at the time of the signature of the Paris agreements by which the doors of NATO were flung open to West Germany and the way was paved for West German rearmament, the Western Powers sought to reassure their own peoples and world public opinion by pointing out that the West German Government, in the person of its Chancellor, had given an undertaking not to produce any atomic, chemical or biological weapons on its territory. As you also know, the Soviet Government then gave a warning that this was merely a stratagem, a temporary manoeuvre by the West German militarists, who would repudiate the limitations of the Paris agreements at the first convenient opportunity.

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The Western Powers at that time tried to convince everyone that the undertakings given by the West German Chancellor were serious. But, if that is so, if West Germany has in fact renounced nuclear weapons and its declaration in Paris has any value, then why is the United States in such a hurry to meet Bonn's demands that West Germany should be given access to nuclear weapons, and to set up a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force with that end in view? That is a perfectly legitimate question. Why does the United States assert -- or, more accurately, why does it attempt to justify its course of action by arguing -- that West Germany would otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons? How can it reconcile that argument with its reference to Dr. Adenauer's declaration that West Germany undertakes not to produce nuclear weapons on its territory? A comparison of these two aspects of one and the same issue clearly shows that the United States has become confused in its nuclear policy, in its policy of negotiating "from a position of strength".

What will happen when West Germany's NATO allies find themselves face to face with West German militarists who have obtained access to nuclear bombs? Bonn will certainly sing a different tune then. It will then acquire considerable opportunities for blackmailing its own allies. The following true incident casts light on the mentality and plans of West German ruling circles. Some six weeks ago the most important West German industrialists, the bosses of those branches of West German industry which once served as the basis and foundation of the German militarism that was responsible for the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars and which are ensuring the present rearmament of the Bundeswehr, these uncrowned kings of the automobile, tractor and tank industries of West Germany, frankly expressed their views on past events and their plans for the future. What they said was: "We Germans lost the First World War. We lost the Second World War. Why? Because the United States was against us. But we are going to win the third world war, because the United States is now our ally".

What, I ask, can you expect from people like this, people who occupy key economic and financial positions, and hence key political positions, in West Germany and who take a third world war into account in their affairs as an inevitable factor -- or, more exactly, as a factor which they themselves have planned? Clearly, nothing will stop people who make statements like that from embarking on new gambles and from precipitating a new world-wide conflagration, which this time will be a nuclear conflagration.



(Mr. Tserapkin, USSR)

The German militarists make no attempt to conceal how they propose to use the nuclear weapons to which they obtain access. A secret memorandum drawn up by German generals and published in the newspaper Deutsche Woche of 1 January 1962 states that the restoration of Germany within the limits of its historic national frontiers is inconceivable without atomic weapons. Mr. von Hassel, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressing deputies of the Christian-Democratic Union and Christian-Social Union grouping in the West German Bundestag on 12 November 1963, declared himself in favour of using atomic weapons before one's opponent. In other words, atomic weapons in the hands of the Federal Republic of Germany are to be a weapon of revenge even to the point of being used for a preventive nuclear war.

It is precisely in this development that the real danger lies, and it is precisely this danger that should be averted by preventing the further dissemination of atomic weapons. But what is the United States doing at the present time? Once again I quote The New York Times. Its correspondent reports:

"The United States seeks completion of the discussions [on the multilateral nuclear force] by the end of the spring ...

"This is because West Germany, already the largest European contributor to the alliance's conventional forces, believes that the establishment of the fleet will give it a share in the West's nuclear armament." (New York Times, 29 February 1964, pp. 1, 5)

The question of preventing the further dissemination of nuclear weapons is a most serious and immediate one. In order to ensure that any solution of this problem shall be real and not a fiction, it is essential that an agreement on this matter should include, in addition to a ban on the direct transfer to any State of these weapons or of information on their production, provisions guaranteeing that any such transfer of nuclear weapons, or the granting of access to these weapons, should not take place indirectly through military blocs, through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

The Committee has before it proposals the implementation of which would make a real contribution towards establishing a dependable barrier against the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

First of all, we have the proposal by the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the total renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two German States (ENDC/124). The Government of the German Democratic Republic has taken a peace-loving step in expressing its readiness to renounce nuclear weapons provided that the other German State does likewise. The position taken on this proposal of the German Democratic Republic will be a touchstone by which we can judge how far the professed desire of this or that State to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons is sincere and genuine.

How have the representatives of the Western Powers reacted to this appeal from the Government of the German Democratic Republic? Mr. Foster, the United States representative, indicated at the Committee's meeting of 4 February that he did not wish to discuss this proposal (ENDC/PV.163, pp. 28, 29). And yet this proposal deals with an extremely important measure designed to assist in the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic has proposed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that an agreement should be concluded not to produce or acquire atomic weapons, not to test them or station them on their own territories, and never to use them. If the two German States had assumed such an undertaking, we should not now be discussing the danger to the peace of the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany; and the main obstacle to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons would have been eliminated.

Progress towards a solution of the problem of preventing the further dissemination of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be facilitated by the establishment of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world. The establishment of such zones would reduce the number of countries on whose territories nuclear weapons are produced or stationed, and would at the same time deliver many States and peoples from the risk of a nuclear attack.

Of recent years the idea of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world has received general recognition and approval. Proposals have been made for the establishment of such zones in central and northern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans, ~~Africa~~ and Latin America, and in other parts of the world. These proposals have been meeting with ever-growing support from both governments and public opinion in many countries. I shall give you the most recent illustrations of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

this. A few weeks ago the second session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity was held in Lagos, the capital of Nigeria. According to press reports it considered a proposal that Africa should be declared a denuclearized zone, and it prepared a draft of an appropriate convention, which was submitted for the consideration of the governments concerned. A few days ago a conference representative of the public of the Scandinavian countries was held in Stockholm and called upon the Governments of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland to renounce nuclear weapons for all time.

Our Committee has received General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 (ENDC/116), which proposes that the Committee should study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. We have heard references to this resolution from Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria (ENDC/PV.159, p.11), and Mr. Agede, the representative of Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.162, p.7), who have stressed the importance of finding a solution to this problem. In present conditions the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons would be a very significant step forward along the road opened by the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and other well-known decisions. For that reason the Soviet Union warmly welcomes the initiative of Ethiopia and various other African and Asian countries in proposing the adoption of a declaration, and subsequently a convention, on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has declared itself ready to assist in organizing such a conference and to take part in it, believing that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would help to ease international tension and strengthen confidence among States, and would facilitate a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

If a State is genuinely striving for the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the easing of international tension, wide opportunities are open to it at the present time.

At the meeting of the Committee on 19 March Mr. Lobodycz, the representative of Poland, referred to the latest Polish proposal for the conclusion of an agreement on freezing nuclear armaments in central Europe. This proposal has recently been submitted for the consideration of the interested governments. Referring to the aim behind this proposal, the representative of Poland said:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"... such an agreement should bar once and for all, all ways, both direct and indirect, towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those States which do not now possess them". (ENDC/PV.176, p.11)

In this connexion the representative of Poland declared that the establishment of the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force ran counter to that basic requirement and therefore stood in the way of reaching an agreement on the non-dispersion of nuclear weapons. (ibid., p.12).

The Soviet Government regards the proposal by the Polish People's Republic for the freezing of nuclear weapons in central Europe as a positive one. In its view, the conclusion of such an agreement on the freezing of nuclear armaments in central Europe would have a positive effect primarily because it would be designed to prevent the West German revanchists from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government is in favour of working out a broad programme of measures to facilitate the implementation of disarmament and the easing of international tension. The desirability of taking such measures is clearly demonstrated by very favourable results achieved by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

In this connexion it should be pointed out that, as a consequence of the race in the testing and developing of nuclear weapons which was started in 1945 by the United States of America, an ever-increasing quantity of radioactive substances has been ejected into the human environment, and particularly the atmosphere, during a period of more than fifteen years. The Moscow Treaty has put an end to the further entry of radioactive substances into man's external environment. If from henceforth no State conducts nuclear tests, it creates the necessary conditions for the elimination of the uptake of radioactive substances by the human organism and the danger of harmful radiation effects, or at least for their reduction to the normal natural minimum.

The Soviet delegation would like to bring to the Committee's notice a document containing a report by the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (ENDC/129). On the basis of precise scientific data this document shows that there has been a general improvement in the situation with regard to radiation as a result of the cessation of nuclear testing under the Moscow Treaty.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of tests raised hopes throughout the world of a favourable solution to other problems. Our task -- the task of the members of this Committee -- consists in assisting the development of events in the direction indicated by the signing of this important agreement.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the proposal made today by Mr. Thomas regarding the establishment of observation posts (ENDC/130). The first thing which strikes one about this proposal is the complete absence of any new ideas, of any new thoughts. It essentially amounts to control without disarmament, control over armaments. The United Kingdom delegation continues to divorce the establishment of observation posts from effective steps which would lessen the danger of war.

Since this point has been raised, I would remind the Committee that the Soviet Government has always been and still is in favour of taking real and effective measures to prevent a sudden attack. It is well known that the Soviet Union has to this end submitted a proposal for the establishment of a network of observation posts on the territories of the countries belonging to the two opposing groups of States, in conjunction with certain measures for lessening international tension such as a reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in the territories of European countries, and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government considers that if the establishment of observation posts is carried out in isolation from these concrete measures for the easing of international tension and the limitation of armaments, it cannot achieve the desired objective -- the growth of confidence among States and the lessening of the risk of war. On the contrary, it might even lead to an increase in tension on both sides and to the aggravation of international relations.

The establishment of a system of observation posts can prove useful only in conjunction with concrete measures for lessening the threat of war. Practical steps for a real lessening of the possibility of an outbreak of military conflict in Europe and the establishment of observation posts would in that case be two complementary aspects of a single process -- the lessening of tension in the danger zones where the armed forces of the opposing groups face each other.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The proposal submitted today for the consideration of the Committee by the United Kingdom representative, if we understood Mr. Thomas correctly, relates to a measure which, as I have already explained, is completely divorced from measures for reducing international tension. I would again stress that the adoption of such a proposal can only foster baseless illusions and do harm, not good, to the cause of disarmament; it can only strengthen suspicion and mistrust between States.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): As it is late, the representative of Romania has kindly agreed not to speak today. I should like to thank him, and I hope that we shall have the pleasure of hearing him at the next meeting.

I should also myself have liked to speak in support of the proposal regarding observation posts put forward today by the United Kingdom and United States delegations, and to assure the United Kingdom delegation that I consider that its document (ENDC/130) constitutes a very good and useful basis for our study on this subject. However, in view of the late hour I will also postpone my remarks on this question to the next meeting.

The Foreign Minister of Brazil has asked to speak at the end of this meeting, but before he does so I should like to call on the United States representative, who has just asked for the floor.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with great interest to the remarks of the Soviet representative concerning observation posts, and I shall want in due course to respond to several of his observations. At this moment, however, I should like to deal only with the question of linking observation posts to certain other measures. That is a link with which we do not agree. As the Soviet representative knows, it is largely insistence on such a link that has prevented fruitful consideration of this measure up to now, and I regret that the proposal or such a link has again been raised. However, I hope the Soviet Union will not insist that we cannot even explore the merits of this measure until we have agreed to its proposed linking, because that would cause us great difficulty.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The Soviet representative dealt, in other areas, with some matters upon which the position of the United States has been stated on many occasions, both here and elsewhere. In view of the lateness of the hour and the forbearance of my colleagues, I shall not take the Committee's time to state further the position of the United States, but shall merely reserve the right to reply at some future meeting.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I am aware of the lateness of the hour, and therefore I shall be very brief. As I am leaving Geneva on Monday, I shall not have the opportunity of attending the next meeting of the Committee. I should like to say that I am deeply touched by the friendly welcome I have received and by the generous words addressed to me by several speakers today.

I wish to express my satisfaction at meeting in these proceedings Mr. Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada; Mr. Thomas, the Minister of State of the United Kingdom; and Mr. Malitza, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Romania. Their presence here clearly illustrates their Governments' interest in the proceedings of this important Committee.

I leave this Committee with the conviction that, in spite of difficulties and shortcomings, our proceedings will go on to attain the objectives of peace and disarmament, in keeping with the terms of reference of the various resolutions of the General Assembly concerning our work. The statements delivered on Tuesday and Thursday convinced me that, although the difficulties are enormous, the Committee is by no means inactive, and all its members are fighting actively against the possibility of a stalemate.

I am particularly gratified by the support my friend, Mr. Barrington, generously gave to my suggestion for a possible extension of the Moscow Treaty. We are prepared to accept gradualism on this matter. You may be sure that, in its policy towards disarmament, development and decolonization, Brazil will continue to give its wholehearted and unrestricted support to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Again I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all the members of this Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 178th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Burma, the United States, the Soviet Union and Brazil.

"The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a paper on observation posts.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 31 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

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<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/130